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This article discusses the implications of decentralization in the light of
international and Brazilian federalism, and its effects on public health policy.
In a comparative analysis among countries, the authors find there is no single
model; rather, each country has a unique structure of institutions and norms
that have important implications for the operation of its health system. Brazil
shares some similarities with other countries that have adopted a decen-
tralized system and is assuming features ever closer to U.S. federalism, with
a complex web of relationships. The degree of inequality among Brazilian
municipalities and states, along with the budgetary imbalances caused by
the minimal levels of resource utilization, undermines Brazil’s constitutional
principles and, consequently, its federalism. To ensure the constitutional
mandate in Brazil, it is essential, as in other countries, to create a stable
source of funds and increase the volume and efficiency of spending. Also
important are investing in the training of managers, improving information
systems, strengthening the principles of autonomy and interdependence,
and defining patterns of cooperation within the federation.
The themes of federalism, intergovernmental relations, and decentralization are
of growing interest in Brazilian and international scientific writing. Studies on
these topics generally deal with questions related to power distribution, in the
name of freedom. This helps ensure greater autonomy for localities, establishing
political rights and financial resources, as well as defining obligations to federal
units, mostly through decentralization and resource transfers. Fiscal federalism
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entails the ways in which powers are distributed and fiscal, budgetary, and
contributory intergovernmental relations are established.
The area of fiscal federalism is a subdivision of public finance studies that seeks
to investigate resource transfer mechanisms between federal entities, from the
normative and economic perspectives. Fiscal federalism is also concerned with
well-being and fiscal equalization (1). According to Conti, fiscal federalism is
“the study of how spheres of government interrelate from the financial viewpoint.
It encompasses the analysis of how the state is organized, which type of federation
is adopted, the degree of member autonomy, responsibilities attributed to them
and, most importantly, how they will be financed” (2).
Thus, in considering the unique features of federalism and the trajectory of
health policy in Brazil, it is important to discuss the recent period during which
the country is experiencing a redefinition aimed at designing a new structure of
federal relations (3) and correcting regional imbalances through decentralization.
Success in the decentralization process is highly dependent on the funds avail-
able to fulfill local responsibilities and priorities. When the evolution of federal
social spending is examined by area, health-related spending in Brazil is found
to be at minimal levels (4). This compromises the application of constitutional
principles and, in turn, federalism itself (5).
The present study joins this debate, presenting a comparative analysis among
countries of the federative question, with a specific focus on the health area.
We discuss decentralization and resource transfers, two of the main elements
characterizing fiscal federalism. Financing data indicate low public spending in
Brazil, in what is considered a universal health system. Thus, national and local
studies have stressed the need for increased health resources to guarantee the
constitutional mandate.
To that end, we carried out a theoretical-conceptual review of federalism,
decentralization, and transfers. Fiscal federalism is analyzed by considering the
question of financing and spending as presented in some recent studies, with
data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), World Health Organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organi-
zation, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), and Institute of
Applied Economic Research, among others. We begin by discussing the general
aspects of federalism and how federal institutions influence power distribution
through transitory institutional arrangements. We then demonstrate the relation-
ship between federalism and decentralization. The latter, which has increas-
ingly been adopted as an alternative to centralized structures, is an element
of many health system reforms; transfers play an important role in resource
decentralization by seeking to decrease regional differences. Finally, we discuss
federalism in Brazil—specifically, National Health System (SUS) financing, a
mix of public and private resources and spending that is insufficient for the
needs of the population. The health sector is suffering from inefficiency, lack
of equipment, and inadequate infrastructure.
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GENERAL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM
Federalism is a form of government that, while admitting differences among
states, seeks to integrate them into an organic whole. The amalgamation of
regional divergences and similarities and the political pendulum between local
and central governments demonstrate the importance of this form of government,
as well as—according to many—its democratic nature. In this sense, “federalism
is regarded as a form of power distribution, with many supporters demonstrating
the similarities between democracy and federalism, and considering it the most
progressive form of the state” (6).
Elazar (7) indicates that federalism shares political power in the name of
freedom. Freedom here gains a sense of protection given to citizens against the
abuses of central power, through the advantages of small size. Subnational entities
potentially allow for greater control of policy decisions by the people and grant
the right-to-participate to minority groups, not just to the majority.
We can say, based on the theory of the modern federal state, that federalism
concerns a particular form of geopolitical organization of state power that distin-
guishes it from the unitary and confederative models in relation to key aspects
of structure and function. Federalism divides political authority of the state
(sovereignty) and exercise of power (government) into multiple sovereign
centers, defined geographically and coordinated with each other. The consequence
of this plurality is not the elimination of central power but the existence of an
autonomous national government, voluntarily maintained by the union of all
citizens to achieve common objectives without jeopardizing the rights that exist
in the constituent territories and their diversity of interests (8).
In its modern form, federalism emerged simultaneously with the economic
concept of the market. Although this was not the only reason for creating federa-
tions, creation of a common market and national integration were made possible
by political accords that harmonized economic policies across different areas.
From these accords, a government framework was born, capable of enforcing the
law, guaranteeing property rights and contracts, preserving cultural character-
istics, accommodating political demands, and maintaining the governmental func-
tions of constituent communities (8).
At present, even in unitary states, space is increasingly opening up to ensure
greater autonomy to localities and to create structures that can accommodate
heterogeneity and resolve conflicts. Yet, as demonstrated by creation of the
European Union, globalization has been encouraging the organization of supra-
national federations to maintain political, economic, and social cohesion (8).
Some authors claim that there is no universally valid definition of federalism,
the appropriate division of power, and the correct institutional form for a federa-
tive organization (9). In this view, institutional arrangements are always transient,
the result of a necessary and positive tension and disharmony between the con-
stituent parts of the state, leading to a continuous negotiation process. Although
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the analysis of institutional arrangements is essential for an understanding of
federalism, our understanding of the federal state is not complete until we consider
the characteristics and values of each society that allow for the creation and
functioning of its institutions (10).
In general, studies of federalism use as a reference the U.S. model, one that
allows the “negotiation between individual parts to create and maintain the
federal state, but does not take into account the trajectory of unitary states that
have become federations,” more typical of the recent period (11). Stepan (12)
goes beyond “coming together as federations” represented by the U.S. model,
adding a more comprehensive and updated analytical framework that neces-
sarily includes “holding together federations,” examples of which include the
constitutions of Spain (1976) and Belgium (1993). There, and in other federal
states such as Germany, local power is one of the most relevant dimensions of
participatory democracy, whose positive influence in setting local priorities and
in public policy management is indisputable.
Gibson and colleagues state that “the design of federal institutions has impli-
cations for the way in which power is distributed among federal actors. Institutions
conform (and reform) the distribution of power between actors geographically
and the institutional distribution of power between actors at different levels of
government” (13). Through its institutions, the federal state interacts with the
asymmetries of society, granting certain political rights, providing financial
resources, and defining the obligations of the constituent units of the federation
through infrastructure and public policies. While some institutions reflect these
asymmetries, others compensate by trying to accommodate conflicting interests,
managing the nation’s federal balance.
Federal institutions—the plan of their structures, rules, and processes—give
shape to the federation itself. Introducing their own dynamics and character-
istics in different spheres of public policy, federal institutions help shape the
boundaries of real power between entities at different levels of government, or
at the same level, throughout the history of each society. However, federalism and
its principles are also revealed in the fiscal dimension, especially in the distribu-
tion of economic power—funding at different levels of government, through the
definition of tax structure, forms of revenue, and forms of intergovernmental
transfer mechanisms (14).
Elazar (7) believes that federal institutions lend substance to the combination
of two basic principles: government autonomy and interdependence, the classic
formula called “self-rule plus shared rule” that underlies the federal pact. The
principle of autonomy is that through which federal entities establish their
rules of self-governance (self-rule) and define the range of actions that other levels
of government can impose on them. The principle of interdependence (shared
rule) defines the patterns of cooperation within the federation, establishing a
practice of negotiation capable of defining common goals between governments.
Interdependence favors a complementarity between the spheres of government,
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the need to strengthen federal ties, and the need to create national parameters
respecting regional diversity, thus reducing the risk of breakdown or failure.
Elazar points to “non-centralization” as one of the key elements that charac-
terizes federalism, since subnational levels of government do not act by transfer
or simple delegation of central power (as in unitary states) and do not establish
a fixed order between federal entities. Regardless of how powers are divided,
national and subnational governments have some independence in their spheres of
action and final decisions. Moreover, their authority cannot be removed without
mutual consent, except when found to be in violation of federal principles.
Accordingly, in a comparative study involving 12 federations, Watts (15)
asserts that, in practice, there is no single and permanent model of the center–
periphery relationship in countries that adopt federalism. The oscillation between
centralization and decentralization is intrinsic to federal systems and is present in
the trajectory of these countries. Watts also highlights the difficulty of measuring
the degree of centralization versus decentralization, since there are multiple
possible arrangements in the legislative, administrative, and fiscal plans, con-
stitutional rules, and even the decision-making process, which show distinct
levels of dependence, political influence, and fiscal control between spheres
of government.
FEDERALISM AND DECENTRALIZATION IN
HEALTH SYSTEM MODELS
Arretche (5), on analyzing the relationship between federalism and decentrali-
zation, notes that the degree of centralization in the distribution of administrative
responsibilities has varied greatly throughout the history of federal countries,
but without changing federalism’s essential character: the political authority
given to local governments. In his reflections, he tends to separate the origins
of sovereignty granted to subnational governments under federalism—derived
mainly from direct popular vote, autonomy of the tax base, and in some cases,
their own military—from the factors that influence the administrative power of
a policy throughout different levels of government.
In the context of federations, whether through relocation or consolidation,
decentralization interferes with the balance between the autonomy and inter-
dependence of governments and thus often requires the strengthening of coordina-
tion mechanisms—not limited to the imposition of joint participation, but also
including the establishment of partnerships approved by federal entities. Thus,
decentralization is complex, involving cooperation and competition, agreements
and vetoes, and joint decisions between levels of government (16).
Decentralization has been implemented in countries with stable democracies
as an alternative to centralized decision-making institutions, imposed during
construction of their welfare states—a Keynesian inspiration. In some European
countries, such as France, it was hoped that decentralization would operate as an
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instrument of democratic radicalization, to expand the channels of political par-
ticipation (17). In other countries, such as Italy, decentralization brought expec-
tations of a revitalization of regional governments, which had been depleted of
their power by excessively centralized unitary states (18). In yet other countries,
such as Belgium and Spain, federalism was in great demand as an assertion
of political autonomy for politically underrepresented ethnic groups in unitary
states with majoritarian electoral rule (12).
In the wake of these hopes and expectations, some countries remained unitary
states and adopted extensive programs of decentralization, as in the case of
France and Italy (19). The United Kingdom returned certain prerogatives to
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In other cases, however, federal policy
solutions flourished. Belgium (1993), South Africa (1996), and Spain (1978)
have adopted fully or partially federal systems. In northern Italy, there is strong
pressure for the adoption of federalism. Much of the integration process of the
European Union is based on federal principles (15).
Decentralization is also an aspect of many health system reforms. Some coun-
tries have reorganized their health services to consolidate primary care. A com-
parison between 12 Western industrialized nations indicates that countries with
a stronger orientation to primary care are more likely to have better levels of
health and lower costs. Almost all countries are struggling with their own reforms.
Many nations are attempting to finance their health systems according to egali-
tarian principles (20).
Intergovernmental transfers play an important role in the decentralization
process, ensuring resource distribution. They reinforce the role of central power
in most countries by correcting fiscal inequalities, thereby promoting equal-
ization among subnational units. This establishes revenue and spending levels
compatible with responsibilities, social rights, and obligations, providing
services required by existing public policies, as well as health care access and
investment.
On intergovernmental financial transfer in particular, Banting and Corbett (3)
caution that it is based on the belief that citizens in different regions of the country
are entitled to similar benefits and services, without having to pay significantly
different taxes. Transfer systems tend to diminish the risk that regional differ-
ences, at the tax and benefit levels, will influence the migration of capital and
people within the country, and to compensate for the relationship between health
needs and financing capacity that benefits the most favored regions.
For countries such as Germany, Canada, Australia, and, to a lesser extent,
Switzerland, the “solidarity transfers” are necessary to ensure a reduction in the
budgetary differences between intermediate levels of government, though they
do not always consider the effective needs of spending. These countries are
constantly concerned about accountability. Sovereign subnational governments
use revenue from intergovernmental transfers, some not earmarked for specific
purposes, on local priorities for their own voters (14).
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In Brazil, the decentralization mechanisms for financing health policies are
very fragile. Federal transfers do not take into account the real possibilities
for financial support and increased spending from revenues by the subnational
spheres themselves, and the resources transferred are insufficient to overcome
the budgetary limitations in underdeveloped jurisdictions. In the context of this
study, there are many challenges for the health sector. These include the need
for alterations in existing macroeconomic policy, prioritization of public health
policy, and changes in the institutional rules of Brazilian fiscal federalism (14).
FEDERALISM AND THE BRAZILIAN
HEALTH SYSTEM
Throughout its history, Brazil has seen major changes in its federal arrange-
ments and institutions, which have nevertheless survived even long periods of
military dictatorship and authoritarianism. Federalism emerged as the necessary
way to bridge the country’s enormous regional disparities, not as a response
to ethnic, linguistic, and religious cleavages, as these issues never assumed
great prominence on the Brazilian political agenda (14). According to Souza,
“in every historical moment, these disparities were accommodated in different
ways and these differences are recognized in the constitutional design and tax
structure” (21).
With its economic and historical background, the structure and recent evolu-
tion of the Brazilian federation takes on features increasingly close to the North
American model, as shown by international comparisons of federal experiences
or fiscal decentralization. Shah (22) has classified both as having assignments
that are not distributed in an orderly fashion, with a clear and precise task
division, but occur in a complex web of relationships. Sometimes more than one
government performs the same function in certain regions or time periods; at
other times, one government takes charge of the competencies of another sphere;
and at yet other times, the government is absent or spending is scarce.
The Brazilian federal map contrasts with that of the United States with respect
to both the fiscal autonomy of localities and the nature of their decision-making
processes. The United States stands as a federal system of government in which
decentralized decisions are consistent with urbanization and the concentration
of people in small cities and urban areas, even allowing for direct participation
of the population in local decisions by way of plebiscite (8). Another point is
that Brazil has three levels of government: federal, state, and municipal. The
inclusion of municipalities as federal entities is a unique feature of Brazilian
federalism. Decisions and funding issues, in most cases, migrate from the federal
government to state and municipal entities. The task of establishing rules for a
federation the size of Brazil, a union of 27 states and 5,562 municipalities, is
a complex one. It is in this universe of municipalities, with regional disparities,
that the new model proposed in the Constitution has a profound impact.
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With respect to health, the Brazilian Constitution states that “on the one
hand, private enterprise is free to operate (article 199); on the other, it is a citizens’
right (article 196)—a paradox that tends to undermine public health financing”
(23). Thus, the financing matrix of total health spending must distinguish public
from private resources. After the Constitution, the government established the
SUS, financed by federal taxes and social contributions. Municipal taxes and
resource transfers that finance social spending, particularly health spending, are
the primary sources at the municipal and state levels. The private system is family-
and industry-financed.
Brazil has a duplicate model in which the private sector offers coverage for
nearly all services available in the public sector, but the clientele of private
medicine continue to use the public system (see 24). This situation also exists in
England, where private coverage has been used to reduce waiting times in the
public sector (25, 26).
Almost all OECD countries have public health systems consisting of a regu-
lated set of providers, with policies, programs, and activities financed by the state.
Several models, such as those in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Spain,
and Portugal, rely on general taxation revenues. Germany and France sustain
their public health systems primarily with corporate and employee contributions.
Some countries supplement public financing with user fees. The United States
has a typical free-market health care system, consisting mostly of insurance plans
financed by employers, individuals, or groups. There are also insurance models
with public financing for specific populations, such as the elderly and low-income
groups. Among the OECD countries, the United States stands out for its limited
public financing in the system as a whole (public and private), accounting for
slightly more than 40 percent of total health spending (27).
Most universal systems, though not comprehensive, are mainly publicly
financed, as in the OECD countries. The health system in Brazil is not only
universal but also comprehensive. However, public spending represents only 46
percent of the total, very similar to that in the United States with its free-market
model based on private insurance (28).
There seems to be a contradiction between the redistribution model proclaimed
by the Brazilian Constitution and the level of public health spending. The problem
in Brazil is that public spending is too low for the country to have an effective
health system with universal, comprehensive coverage. In the OECD countries,
financing from public sources for health systems accounts for an average of
70 percent of total spending, ranging from 67.5 percent in Australia to 84.1 percent
in Norway. The United States and China, despite their cultural, political, and
economic differences, are the most important exceptions to this rule, since their
private spending levels are more than 50 percent of the total (29). In Brazil,
however, public participation in total health spending is 42 percent (30, 31). It
may be the only country with a legally mandated universal health system where
private spending exceeds public spending (32).
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As a percentage of GDP (gross domestic product), total health spending (public
and private) in Brazil is 8.4 percent (30, 31). This figure is low when compared
with the United States (15.7%), but is equal to or just slightly lower than in
other OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom (8.4%), Spain (8.5%), Canada
(10.1%), and Australia (8.9%), which also have universal systems (31, 32).
In relative terms, the proportion of public spending on health in Brazil
(45.9%) is comparable with that in the United States (44.6%). In per capita terms,
including private spending on health, Brazil spends US$597, slightly below
the average for Latin American countries (US$622) and about one-fifth that
of the average for selected countries of the OECD. The United States spends
10 times more on health per capita than does Brazil, while its per capita income
is 5 times greater (26).
The British National Health Service, albeit less pluralist, is similar to what
is described in the Brazilian Constitution, with public health spending accounting
for 85.7 percent of allocated resources. It is important to point out that there is
an ongoing public debate in Brazil on whether the system is sufficiently financed
and whether it should be privatized (26).
Mattos and Costa (33), in considering the subject of SUS financing, argue that
public spending on health in Brazil is insufficient to cover the health needs of the
population. The minimal levels of spending may result in government agencies
losing the power to implement their budgets. Watts (15) reflects that autonomy at
the local level is a function not so much of sharing in the transfers of total revenue
available as of the conditions imposed on subnational government spending.
Moreover, the health sector is experiencing a deterioration of corporations
and institutions. The widespread depoliticization is expressed in the alienation of
health professionals, particularly doctors, from the public health system. These
professionals do not perceive the SUS as a collective project of society. On the
one hand, this is partly the result of how the government has been dealing
with health professionals in addressing the processes and administration of
public health in Brazil. On the other hand, the political debate in public areas
such as health is crystallized in the modus operandi, repetitive speeches, and
role of representative bodies (professional or otherwise) hamstrung by disputes
between micro-powers and false ideological confrontations that conceal the lack
of proposals and autonomy to address the real obstacles—in reference to the
health system that Brazilian society can actually afford (34).
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Federalism has been adopted in several countries, with the aim of transferring
resources and administrative and fiscal responsibilities to subnational entities.
These transfers provide greater autonomy, political power, and protections
to citizens, creating structures that can accommodate regional differences.
Federalism has different origins, though based on the model of U.S. federalism,
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which entails negotiation between the individual parts to create and maintain
the federation. It adopts decentralization as its main instrument of implemen-
tation, with the expectation of strengthening local governments and radical-
izing democracy.
From a glance at federalism in a selection of countries, we can conclude that
there is no single model. The particular structures of institutions and norms of
each country have important implications for the functioning of health systems
in terms of access and services, division of labor between levels of government,
and the nature of fiscal relations, which strongly affects the distribution of health
care among citizens. However, health policy is never purely local in any federa-
tion. Regional governments participate in the definition of central government
policies. There are fiscal relations across levels of government and mechanisms
for coordinating their respective programs. Yet the central government and the
decentralization of resources play an important role in all systems.
Decentralization entails the distribution of functions among local govern-
ments in the management of planning and resources, through various insti-
tutions, in an attempt to construct the limits of power between different levels
of government. It is the federated institutions that design the federation. “The
way power is distributed is related to the design of federal institutions” (13).
Power is distributed among entities that interact with society according to
structures with some degree of independence in their sphere of action and final
decision-making.
In this sense, the trajectory of federalism in Brazil has similarities to inter-
national federalism, driven by a consensus on decentralization, as in France, Italy,
Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, and other countries that have relied on a variety of
ideologies. Brazilian federalism assumes features ever closer to North American
federalism, with a complex web of relationships. However, despite its political-
institutional performance shaped by the U.S. Constitution, Brazilian federalism
has never reproduced the historical process of harmonization and interests
achieved by the United States. The federal map of Brazil contrasts with that of
the United States in both the fiscal autonomy of localities and the nature of
their decision-making. The existence of conflicting interests has hampered the
construction of cooperative agreements in Brazil. With respect to fiscal
federalism, the pattern of transfers does not favor greater equality in public
spending on health (35), which is at minimal levels and generates inequities
among the subnational units. Further differences are evident in financing. “Brazil
is the only country with a universal health system where private spending is
greater than public spending” (32). “The low amount of resources spent in Brazil
compromises the application of constitutional principles and consequently,
federalism. The health sector is suffering from inefficiency, lack of equipment
and inadequate infrastructure” (5).
Despite advances in health care, there continues to be a need for federal
coordination that allows responsibilities and priorities to be fulfilled at the
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local level, as well as health investments. It is important to establish the model
to be used by the state to organize the health care system, including the mixture
of public and private services and the relative weight of public financing and
private resources. Therefore, the challenge of building a logic of federal
coordination remains, and Brazil can learn from the examples of Germany,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, the United States, and other countries, in their per
capita expenditure, performance of local governments, and institutional channels.
It is this perspective that frames the debate on the role of decentralization of
health care in the Brazilian federation. In summary, then, as studies on feder-
alism continue to evolve, the hope is that new insights will emerge regarding the
causal mechanisms underlying the relations between health spending, institu-
tional questions, and political factors.
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